{
  "original_vulnerability": {
    "cve": "CVE-2026-5245",
    "root_cause": "Stack buffer overflow in mDNS response construction - fixed 282-byte buffer in handle_mdns_query() without bounds checking when building DNS-SD records",
    "sink_function": "build_txt_record() in src/dns.c:390",
    "trigger_condition": "mDNS PTR query with TXT record > buffer capacity"
  },
  "variant_analysis": {
    "tested_variants": [
      {
        "variant": "TXT Query Path",
        "query_type": "TXT (type 16)",
        "same_root_cause": true,
        "same_sink": "build_txt_record() in src/dns.c:390",
        "fix_coverage": "Protected by bounds check at lines 514-516"
      },
      {
        "variant": "SRV Query Path",
        "query_type": "SRV (type 33)",
        "same_root_cause": true,
        "same_sink": "build_srv_record() and build_a_record() in src/dns.c",
        "fix_coverage": "Protected by bounds check at lines 521-524"
      },
      {
        "variant": "A Record Query Path",
        "query_type": "A (type 1)",
        "same_root_cause": true,
        "same_sink": "build_a_record() in src/dns.c",
        "fix_coverage": "Protected by bounds check at lines 536-538"
      }
    ]
  },
  "conclusion": "All tested variants share the same root cause (unbounded buffer write in mDNS response construction) and same sink functions. The fix comprehensively covers all variants by adding bounds checking for all query types (PTR, TXT, SRV, A) before response construction begins.",
  "equivalence_confidence": "high"
}