{
  "same_root_cause": true,
  "confidence": "high",
  "explanation": "All tested variants reach the same vulnerable sink: NewHostVolumePluginExternal in client/hostvolumemanager/host_volume_plugin.go. The root cause is identical: a user-supplied filename (PluginID) is joined with a configured directory (pluginDir) and used as an executable path without enforcing that the resolved path stays within the directory. The fix replaces filepath.Join + os.Stat with os.OpenRoot + root.Stat, which contains the resolution. Variants differ only in the entry point used to deliver the malicious PluginID (Create, Register->Delete, or symlink), but the underlying flaw and sink are the same.",
  "variant_paths": [
    "HostVolume.Create with explicit NodeID bypasses server feasibility, reaches client getPlugin",
    "HostVolume.Register updates PluginID in raft state, HostVolume.Delete forwards it to client getPlugin",
    "Symlink inside plugin directory reached via fingerprint or direct PluginID reference"
  ],
  "sink": "client/hostvolumemanager/host_volume_plugin.go:NewHostVolumePluginExternal -> exec.CommandContext",
  "blocked_by_fix": true,
  "blocking_mechanism": "os.OpenRoot(pluginDir) with RESOLVE_IN_ROOT prevents path resolution from escaping the plugin directory"
}