{
  "root_cause_id": "jeecg-openapi-missing-shiro-authz-annotations",
  "parent_root_cause": "OpenApiAuthController (/openapi/auth/*) endpoints lack Shiro @RequiresRoles/@RequiresPermissions annotations; ShiroConfig maps /** to the auth-only jwt filter, so any authenticated user (incl. low-priv test role) performs full CRUD on OpenAPI AK/SK credentials.",
  "variant_root_cause": "Identical mechanism reached via different controllers: OpenApiLogController (/openapi/record/*) and OpenApiPermissionController (/openapi/permission/*) also lack Shiro authorization annotations, and the same /** -> jwt (auth-only) filter chain applies, so any authenticated low-priv user performs full CRUD on the OpenAPI audit-log table and can grant/enumerate OpenAPI permissions on any auth record.",
  "shared_sink": "Shiro authorization layer (AuthorizationAttributeSourceAdvisor) is never invoked because the controller methods carry no @RequiresRoles/@RequiresPermissions annotation; the JwtFilter only authenticates.",
  "shared_configuration": "jeecg-boot/jeecg-boot-base-core/src/main/java/org/jeecg/config/shiro/ShiroConfig.java line 202: filterChainDefinitionMap.put(\"/**\", \"jwt\") where jwt=JwtFilter (authentication only).",
  "same_root_cause_confidence": "high",
  "equivalence_reasoning": "Both the parent and this variant depend on the identical security-control gap: (1) Shiro performs authentication-only at the filter level for /** (no role/permission enforcement in the filter chain), and (2) authorization is delegated entirely to method-level annotations that are simply absent on the target controllers. The only difference is WHICH unannotated controller is invoked. The trigger mechanism, the trust boundary (authenticated remote low-priv user -> admin-protected operation), the authentication primitive (valid JWT for a test-role user), and the bypassed control (Shiro AuthorizationAttributeSourceAdvisor) are all identical.",
  "surface_difference": "Parent surface = /openapi/auth/* (OpenApiAuthController, credential CRUD + plaintext SK). Variant surface = /openapi/record/* (OpenApiLogController, audit-log CRUD/tampering) and /openapi/permission/* (OpenApiPermissionController, permission grant/enumeration). Different controllers, URL prefixes, protected resources, and (for variant A) a different impact class not described by the CVE.",
  "is_bypass": false,
  "is_bypass_reason": "No official patch exists, so there is no fixed code path to bypass. The variant is an alternate trigger of the same root cause, confirmed on the latest available code (v3.9.2 == master HEAD for the affected files).",
  "would_evade_parent_fix": true,
  "would_evade_parent_fix_reason": "The parent RCA's recommended fix annotates only OpenApiAuthController mutating endpoints and OpenApiPermissionController.add. OpenApiLogController (/openapi/record/*) is entirely unmentioned and would remain unprotected, so variant A would survive that fix. OpenApiPermissionController.getOpenApi would also remain unprotected."
}